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Abstract
A stochastic model checker is presented for analysing the perfor-
mance of game-theoretic learning algorithms. The method enables the
comparison of short-term behaviour of learning algorithms intended for
practical use. The procedure of comparison is automated and it can be
tuned for accuracy and speed. Users can choose from among various
learning algorithms to select a suitable one for a given practical prob-
lem. The powerful performance of the method is enabled by a novel
behaviour-similarity-relation, which compacts large state spaces into
small ones. The stochastic model checking tool is tested on a set of ex-
amples classified into four categories to demonstrate the effectiveness
of selecting suitable algorithms for distributed decision making.
1 Introduction
Distributed decision making has recently received considerable attention for
the development of autonomous agent teams, and in general, where agents
need to make their decision in interaction with their environment, including
other agents. Where autonomy is a desired property for a robotic agent
application, for instance in remote or dangerous fields, battle fields, disaster
sites, mining and nuclear waste processing applications, in such scenarios
game-theoretic learning algorithms can be used as coordination mechanism
between agents. Other applications are field robotics [18], wireless sensor
networks [9,10], smart grids [1,23], disaster management [7,20] and schedul-
ing tasks [21]. Game theoretic learning can also be useful in complex envi-
ronment such as autonomous urban transport, warehouses, airports and con-
struction sites, as direct communication between agents could be blocked or
broken and consequently the system has some random, stochastic behaviour.
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When autonomy is a desirable property of an agent team then distributed
decision making becomes an important attribute. Coordination mechanisms
are needed to enable the agents to accomplish a task or achieve a goal. Many
learning algorithms have been proposed in the literature for coordination
mechanisms, which differ in communication requirements, computational
cost and presence or absence of convergence proofs. Overall, there has how-
ever been no technique available to study collective behaviour when only a
small number of iterations are allowed to achieve results. From an applica-
tion point of view it is important to learn and accomplish some desired task
quickly due to various constraints. This paper provides methods to study
learning performance during short periods.
Apart from short time periods for learning, a second hindrance of ef-
fective cooperation can be the communication bandwidth and the amount
of communication needed for collective achievement by an agent team. A
game-theoretic formulation, where agents mostly observe each other, and
communicate little, is favourable for many applications. The game theoretic
cooperation we consider in this paper needs very little or no communication
at all between agents. Lack of communication is compensated by the agent’s
observing each other and learning each others strategies.
A cooperative game-theoretic learning algorithm can be used to solve a
single decision problem. In a complex task, where a sequence of decisions
are needed, a sequence of algorithms can be applied. If this approach is
applicable, then games in strategic form are generated for each type of de-
cision making problem in a scenario of players, physical environment and
rewards. This strategic form game can be seen as a snapshot of a gen-
eral learning framework, which models the whole process of accomplishing
the task. For example, partially observable games (POGs) are the game
theoretic equivalent of decentralised Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes (dec-POMDPs) [3, 13, 15]. A technique for solving a POG is to
generate strategic form games each time there is a change in the scenario
of the word., i.e. a strategic form game is based on the scenario of the
world, meaning the players, the physical environment and the shared goal
and reward functions. In the snapshot, the scenario does not change any
more, and players then choose actions to maximise their rewards [3,4] using
game-theoretic learning algorithms.
Traditional approaches to analysing the performance of a game-theoretic
learning algorithm are usually based on convergence proofs (Nash and Pareto
Nash optima) or based on extensive simulation studies. In simulation it
is not always feasible or easy to understand the agents’ behaviour. The
amount of simulations needed can be huge, which can leave the possibilities
of bad behaviour unexplored. This paper introduces and analyses a stochas-
tic model checking method which bundles sets of state evolutions together
to reduce complexity and hence makes probabilistic verification feasible and
practicable to replace simulation studies.
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The techniques presented explore the whole state space of a given learn-
ing problem. A state implies a probability distribution of joint actions by
game players in a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC); a transition be-
tween two states represents a joint action associated with a firing probability.
Such a DTMC-based state-space model can contain a large number of states
due to the parameters used in some algorithms. We introduce a behaviour
similarity relation “” among states, which enables efficient computation of
steady state probabilities using probabilistic model checking [16] for Nash
Equilibria. The performance of a learning algorithm can be measured by
the probability at which a Nash equilibrium will be observed after a finite
number of iterations. Nash equilibria are good measures of performance as
they can be seen as optimal solutions to distributed decision making prob-
lems. However, our verification tool is not restricted to the cases where
steady states exist. It is possible that a learning algorithm will not reach a
steady state after a small number of iterations, or that a specific sequence
of joint actions will lead to a steady state after a few iterations, while other
sequences will not. The tool can be used to compute all these probabilities
and analyse all the possible short term outcomes of the learning-algorithms
within a given time period.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First our game theoretic frame-
work is defined with learning, which is followed in Section 2.2 by simulation
examples using Fictitious Play [2] on the coordination game of Equation
(4) and the Shapley’s game [17]. The approach for computing finite prob-
abilities for a game with initial conditions is presented in Section 3. We
show comparison among all supported algorithms on several examples in
Section 4, and conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Game-theoretic definitions
Definition 1 A game in strategic form has the following elements [6]:
• A set of players, i = 1, 2, . . . , I;
• A set Ai of actions for each player i, from which it selects its action
ai;
• A set A = ×i=Ii=1Ai of joint actions, where a joint action a ∈ A is of
the form a = (a1, a2, . . . , aI);
• A reward function ri : A→ R, where ri(a) is the reward that player i
will gain if the joint action a is played.
Given a joint action a = (a1, a2, . . . , aI), we often write ai ∈ a to indicate
that ai (1 ≤ i ≤ I) is a component of a. We also refer to the set of joint
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actions of all players but i as A−i, and ri(ai, a−i) the reward that player
i will gain if he plays action ai and its opponents play a−i ∈ A−i. Often
we write ri(ai), instead of ri(ai, a−i), when a−i is of no interest. Let ∆i
be the set of all the probability distributions over player i’s action space.
A strategy σi ∈ ∆i denotes the probability distribution player i uses to
choose from its available actions, and σi(ai) the probability of choosing
action ai ∈ Ai. A pure strategy is the case where player i choose a single
action with probability 1. Other cases are mixed strategies. A joint strategy
is defined as σ =
I∏
i=1
σi ∈ ×i=Ii=1 ∆i. We often write σ−i for a joint strategy
of player i’s opponents. We write σ(ai, σ−i) for the probability of player i
playing action ai when its opponents use strategies σ−i. By some abuse of
notation, we use ri(ai, σ−i) to denote the expected reward of player i when
it chooses action ai and its opponents use the joint strategy σ−i, i.e.,
ri(ai, σ−i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
ri(ai, a−i)σ−i(a−i),
where σ−i(a−i) is the probability of playing the joint action a−i by player
i’s opponents. Similarly, for a strategy σi, we can write
ri(σi, σ−i) =
∑
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
σi(ai)ri(ai, a−i)σ−i(a−i).
To choose actions, players can use either deterministic or stochastic rules
based on joint strategies. A common deterministic rule is best response
(BR) σˆ in Equation (1) where players choose an action maximising their
expected reward. Therefore the payers are rational, as they always increase
or maintain their reward, given that the other players are rational players
too and the estimates of the other players’ strategies are correct.
σˆi = argmax
σi∈∆i
ri(σi, σ−i) (1)
Remark. Let us introduce some arbitrary mapping of Ai into M :=
{1, . . . , |Ai|} where |Ai|, is the cardinality of Ai. Denote a generic element of
M by j. In other words, the j is an indexing of the elements of M according
to some arbitrary but fixed ordering. If a game has more than one best
response, then we consider that players will always choose the action with
the smallest index j.
Smooth best response σ¯ in Equation (2) is the most common stochastic
rule.
σ¯i(ai, σ−i) =
exp(ri(ai, σ−i)/τ)∑
a˜i∈Ai exp(ri(a˜i, σ−i)/τ)
(2)
where τ is a randomisation parameter.
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With a relatively large τ , e.g., τ = 0.01, smooth best response allows
players to choose actions that do not maximise their expected reward with
non-zero probability. When players use a small τ , e.g., 0.0001, they intend
to choose with probability 1 the action that maximises their expected re-
ward, which is equivalent to best response. A small τ is preferred in many
practical applications because of its deterministic nature, which makes the
game playing predictable. On the other hand, it reduces the chances of
exploring different actions, which could lead to find better solutions either
in few iterations or with high probability [12]. In the rest of the paper,
we combine two decision rules together by using smooth best response with
τ = 0.01 in the first iteration and best response in other iterations. This is a
very simple annealing scheme [11] to make a balance between probabilistic
and deterministic behaviour.
Nash in [14] proved that every game has at least one equilibrium which
is a fixed point in the best response correspondence. Thus, when players
choose their actions using Equation (1), a strategy σˆ is a Nash equilibrium
if
ri(σˆi, σˆ−i) ≥ ri(σi, σˆ−i) for all σi ∈ ∆i, i = 1, . . . , I. (3)
Equation (3) implies that if the joint strategy , σˆ is played in a game and it
is a Nash equilibrium, then no player can increase its rewards by unilaterally
changing its own strategy. When all the players in a game select their actions
using pure (mixed, resp.) strategies, the equilibria are called pure (mixed,
resp.) strategy Nash equilibria. An equilibrium is called Pareto efficient if
no other joint mixed strategy can increase the payoff of all the players.
Example. Equation (4) shows a simple coordination game
r =
[ a1 a2
b1 1, 1 0, 0
b2 0, 0 1, 1
]
(4)
In this example, player 1 can choose action b1 or b2, and player 2 can choose
a1 or a2. In each row and column intersection the rewards of players 1 and
2 are listed. The maximum reward, and pure Nash equilibrium of the game,
is 1 for both players when they execute the joint action (b1, a1) or (b2, a2).
2.2 Basic game-theoretic learning algorithms
Iterative learning algorithms have been introduced as negotiation mecha-
nisms between the agents. Typically, such an algorithm works as follows [5].
Each player repeatedly plays the game by trying to estimate other players’
next move based on the observation of their behaviour history, and then
selecting its own action to maximise its reward. They stop the iterative as-
sessment if either they converge to an equilibrium or the maximum number
of iterations is reached.
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Fictitious Play [2] is the canonical example of game-theoretic learning.
Each player i in the initial iteration has a non-negative weight function
κi→j0 ∈ (0, 1) for the actions of each of its opponents j (j ∈ {1, . . . , I}\{i})
and update this weight function after observing player j’s action. Note
here that the initial weights can be any arbitrary positive real number but
this can significantly influence the estimations of opponents strategies and
for that reason we choose to normalise the initial weights in order to be
between zero and one. Therefore, we have∑
aj∈Aj
κi→j0 (a
j) = 1. (5)
Based on these weights, each player estimates its opponents’ strategies
and choose an action that maximises its expected reward. Let κi→jt (aj) be
player i’s weight for player j’s action aj ∈ Aj at the t-th iteration, and
ajt ∈ Aj the action chosen by player j at the t-th iteration. At the t-th
iteration, the weight is updated as follows.
κi→jt (a
j) = κi→jt−1 (a
j) + I
ajt−1=aj
, (6)
where I
ajt=a
j =
{
1 if ajt−1 = a
j
0 otherwise.
Equation (6) simply increases the weight by 1 for the action executed in
the previous iteration. Fictitious play is based on the implicit assumption
that players use the same strategy in all iterations of the game. Based on
this assumption, player i uses a multinomial distribution to estimate player
j’s strategy σi→jt (aj) by the following formula:
σi→jt (a
j) =
κi→jt (aj)∑
a′∈Aj κ
i→j
t (a
′)
. (7)
Player i chooses the action which maximises its expected reward, based on
Equation (7) and (2). For Equation (2), σ−i = ×j=I∧j 6=ij=1 σi→j .
Remark. We should mention here that BR is a deterministic decision
making rule in the sense that players always choose the action which max-
imises their expected reward. Nonetheless, it can lead to players using mixed
strategies when a number of actions can be played interchangeably in the
iterations of the game. If this is the case, the probability of choosing each
of such actions is always greater than 0.
FP can be seen as the following three step process: (1) observe the
opponents’ actions; (2) update the beliefs about the opponents’ strategies;
(3) choose an action based on (smooth) best response decision rule. Equation
6
(7) can also be written as:
σi→jt (a
j) =
κi→jt (aj)
t+
∑
aj∈Aj κ
i→j
1 (a
j)
=
κi→jt−1 (a
j) + I
ajt−1=aj
t+ 1
=
t · κi→jt−1 (aj)
t · (t+ 1) +
I
ajt−1=aj
t+ 1
=
t
t+ 1
σi→jt−1 (a
j) +
I
ajt−1=aj
t+ 1
= (1− 1
t+ 1
)σi→jt−1 (a
j) +
1
t+ 1
I
ajt−1=aj
.
(8)
In addition to FP, our probabilistic model checker also supports the fol-
lowing learning algorithms: Geometric fictitious play (GFP) [5], and Adap-
tive forgetting factor fictitious play(AFFFP) [19]. These algorithms can be
classified into the same category: Algorithms based on weighted average his-
tory of actions. They take into account all the history of players’ actions
in order to estimate their opponents’ strategies. Actions are then selected
based on these estimations. The differences of these algorithms are based
on the impact of the recently observed action on the estimation of the other
players’ strategies. They increase the impact of the recent observation using
discount factors when estimating σ−i.
Example. Given the initial estimation in Equation (9) for the game in (4),
κ1→20 = [0.511, 0.489]
T and κ2→10 = [0.489, 0.511], (9)
we use smooth best response in Equation (2) with τ = 10−2 to compute the
initial joint strategies, and use best response thereafter. When the game is
started, we obtain that σ1→20 = σ
−1
0 = κ
1→2
0 , σ
2→1
0 = σ
−2
0 = κ
2→1
0 . Using
the above weights, equation (2) and τ = 0.01 we obtain σ¯10 = [0.9, 0.1]
T and
σ¯20 = [0.1, 0.9]. This means that player 1 has probability to choose actions b1
and b2 with probability 0.9 and 0.1 respectively, and player 2 chooses action
a1 and a2 with probability 0.1 and 0.9 respectively.
The initial joint strategy is shown in the ellipse node in Figure 1. It
means that the probability of executing (b1, a1), (b1, a2), (b2, a1) and (b2, a2)
is 0.09, 0.81, 0.01 and 0.09 respectively. If the players execute (b1, a1), then
they update their weight function using Equation (6) and obtain
κ1→21 = [1.511, 0.489]
T and κ2→11 = [1.489, 0.511]. (10)
The new joint strategy generated using Equations (7) and (1) is shown in
the top left rectangular node in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Five layer expansions of possible simulation traces.
Figure 2: Simulations for the game in Equation (4)
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Figure 2 are examples showing that it is difficult or impossible to un-
derstand agents’ behaviour from simulation. Figure 2 shows that FP being
trapped in a cycle when the game is repeatedly played for the initial con-
ditions in Figure 1. The top figure illustrates the selected actions when the
branch with initial probability 0.81 is expanded and the bottom figure the
selected actions when the branch with initial probability 0.01 is expanded.
In this simple case, we can observe that the two simulation runs are similar.
The same cycle of actions is repeated in both figures, but they have one
iteration lag. Thus, in the top figure joint action (b1, a2) is played in the
odd iterations, while in the bottom figure it is played in the even iterations.
In more complicated cases, where joint actions are repeated with lag greater
than one, or the lag is unknown, it would be hard or even infeasible to
determine if two simulation runs are similar.
2.3 Other learning algorithms
Geometric Fictitious Play. In FP all the previous actions are of the
same importance because of the assumption that opponents’ strategies are
stationary. Geometric fictitious play (GFP) is a variant of FP that addresses
this incorrect assumption by exponential decaying the importance of the
historical data, by a factor α (0 < α < 1). Thus, the recently observed
actions are more important in the estimation of the opponents’ strategies,
which is based on the following formula:
σi→jt (a
j) = (1− α)σi→jt (aj) + αIajt−1=aj , (11)
where I
ajt−1=aj
=
{
1 if ajt−1 = a
j
0 otherwise.
Adaptive Forgetting Factor Fictitious Play. Even though GFP
addresses the incorrect assumption of FP that the strategies of other players
are constant, it requires the players to know in advance the rate the other
players change their strategy since it uses a constant α throughout the game.
In order to overcome this limitation, adaptive forgetting factor fictitious
play (AFFFP) was introduced in [19]. In this variant of FP there is a time
varying discount factor λt−1 which is adjusted based on the likelihood of
the previously observed actions. Opponents’ strategies are estimated as
in Equation (7), but the weights of opponents strategies are discounted as
follows:
κi→jt (a
j) = λjt−1κ
i→j
t−1 (a
j) + I
ajt−1=aj
(12)
where I
ajt−1=aj
is the same identity function as in Equation (6). Let njt =∑
aj∈Aj κ
i→j
t (a
j) be the normalisation divisor in Equation (7). Based on
(12), we can use the following recursion to evaluate njt :
njt = λ
j
t−1n
j
t−1 + 1,
9
where
λt = λt−1 + γ
( 1
κi→jt−1 (a)
∂
∂λ
κi→jt−1 (a)−
1
njt−1
∂
∂λ
njt−1
)
,
where γ ∈ (0, 1] is a learning rate parameter which controls the impact of
the observed actions in the new value of the adaptive factor λ,
∂
∂λ
κi→jt (a)|λ=λt−1 = κi→jt−1 (a) + λt−1
∂
∂λ
κi→jt−1 (a)|λ=λt−1
and
∂
∂λ
njt |λ=λt−1 = njt−1 + λt−1
∂
∂λ
njt−1|λ=λt−1 .
2.4 Discrete-Time Markov Chains
Given a set S, let Dist(S) be the set of all discrete probability distributions
over S, each of which is of the form p : S → [0, 1] such that ∑s∈S p(s) = 1.
Definition 2 A DTMC M is a tuple 〈S, s˙, T,P, L〉, where
• S is a set of states,
• s˙ ∈ S is the initial state,
• T : S → Dist(S) is a probabilistic transition relation among states.
We often write Ts(s
′) as the probability of moving from state s to state
s′,
• P is a set of atomic propositions, or simply proposition.
• L : P → 2S is a labelling function that maps a proposition to a subset
of states. A proposition p ∈ P holds in state s ∈ S iff s ∈ L(p).
A finite path ρ is a sequence of states s0s1, . . . , sn such that Tsi(si+1) > 0
for any 0 ≤ i < n. The path ρ is infinite when n → ∞. Various properties
in DTMCs can be verified by probabilistic model checking. In this paper,
we are interested in steady state properties, which specify the behaviour of
a DTMC in the long run, and are captured by bottom strongly connected
components (BSCC).
Definition 3 A set of states S ⊆ S in a DTMC M is a strongly connected
component (SCC) iff the following condition holds:
∀s, s′ ∈ S : there exists a path ρ = s0s1, . . . , sn
such that s = s0 and s
′ = sn. (13)
Definition 4 A set of states S ⊆ S in a DTMC M is a BSCC iff it is an
SCC with the following constraint:
∀s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S : Ts(s′) > 0 implies that s′ ∈ S. (14)
10
Intuitively, a BSCC, bscc hereafter, is a special strongly connected compo-
nent of M such that no states outside bscc can be reached from any states
inside bscc via the probabilistic transition relation. It means that once the
system enters bscc, it is trapped in it and cannot escape. BSCCs in a DTMC
can be identified by applying the Tarjan’s algorithm [22] to partition the
DTMC into SCCs first and then looking for SCCs that do not have outgo-
ing transitions. The model checking algorithms for computing steady-state
probabilities from BSCCs can be found in [16].
Theorem 1 A Nash equilibrium is a BSCC.
Proof 1 Consider a state s that represents the joint strategy σ which is
Nash equilibrium. If we assume that s is not in a BSCC, then a new state
s˜ will be reached with a non-zero probability that will represent a new joint
strategy σ˜. This is a contradiction because a joint strategy σ is a Nash
equilibrium iff no player will deviate from σ.
Note here that a BSCC is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. A well
known example [5] comes from the FP algorithm, when it is used in the
game in Equation (4). It has been shown that FP can fail to converge in the
Nash equilibrium in this game and be trapped in a cycle between the actions
(b2, a1) and (b1, a2), which is also depicted in Figure 3(a). This is a BSCC,
but not a Nash equilibrium. For a Pareto efficient equilibrium, all states in
the BSCC have the same reward. However, it is not true for a non-Pareto
efficient one. In this case, we are interested in the probability by which the
system stays in some of the states in the BSCC. In the example defined
in Equation (4), the Pareto efficient equilibria are captured by single-state
BSCCs that fire (b1, a1) or (b2, a2) only, i.e., with probability 1.
3 Analysis of game-theoretic learning algorithms
We aim to build a framework for performance evaluation of game-theoretic
learning algorithms. It explores all states an algorithm can visit. Each
state contains a joint strategy σ generated from the Cartesian product of
the individual strategy of all players, and extra information pi, which varies
among the learning algorithms.
3.1 State space generation
Definition 5 A state s is a tuple 〈σ, pi〉, where
• σ is the joint strategy of all players, which indicates the likelihood of
firing a joint action,
• pi is a vector of parameters, including weights and other input variables
for the learning algorithm.
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Let κi = {κi→j | j ∈ {1, . . . , I}\{i}} be the weights that player i holds about
all its opponents. The vector pi for each learning algorithm is specified as
follows:
• FP: pi = 〈κ1, . . . , κI〉,
• GFP: pi = 〈κ1, . . . , κI , α〉,
• AFFFP: pi = 〈κ1, . . . , κI , n1, . . . , nI , λ, ∂∂λκ1, . . . , ∂∂λκI , ∂∂λn1, . . . , ∂∂λnI〉,
Given a game and an algorithm, our probabilistic model checker adopts
Breadth-First Search (BFS) to explore the state space from the initial state
s˙ = 〈σ˙, p˙i〉 by firing each joint action with non-zero firing probability and
computing a new state. The exploration algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
As we are interested in short-term behaviour, an upper bound on the depth
in BFS can be set to terminate the exploration if it does not stop within the
bound. If this is the case, then all unexplored states have a transition to a
special termination state ⊥ with probability 1.
Algorithm 1 State space exploration
1: s0 := 〈σ˙, p˙i〉; S := {s0}; enqueue(queue1, s0)
2: depth := 0; i := 1
3: while queue1 6= ∅ do
4: (s = 〈σ, pi〉) := dequeue(queue1)
5: for all a ∈ A do
6: if σ(a) > 0 then
7: 〈σ′′, pi′〉 := UpdateEstimations(pi, a)
8: σ′ := UpdateProbDist(u, σ′′, τ)
9: si := 〈σ′, pi′〉; found := false
10: for all j = i− 1, · · · , 1 do
11: if sj  si then
12: Ts(sj) := σ(a); found := true; break
13: if found = false then
14: Ts(si) := σ(a); S := S ∪ {si}
15: enqueue(queue2, si); i := i+ 1
16: queue1 := queue2; queue2 := ∅; depth := depth+ 1
17: if depth ≥ UpperBound then
18: S := S ∪ {⊥}; T⊥(⊥) := 1
19: for all s ∈ queue1 do
20: Ts(⊥) := 1
21: break
22: return (S, T )
In Algorithm 1, queue1 is used to store states that need to be ex-
panded, and queue2 stores their success states. This is an easy way to
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count the depth of the exploration. Enqueue(queue, s) appends s to the tail
of queue and s := dequeue(queue) removes the head of queue and save it
to s. UpdateEstimations(pi, a) performs the estimation steps of the learn-
ing algorithms, and UpdateProbDist(u, σ′′, τ) is the smooth best response
decision rule defined in Equation (2) or best response in Equation (1). The
probability of a transition executing action a comes from σ(a).
In principle, there could be a large, even infinite, number of states for
certain algorithms due to the way of updating the parameters of these algo-
rithms. For example, the simulation in Figure 1 can be extended to infinite
iterations. However, the same behaviour can be observed from the two grey
nodes in this figure according to Equation (6) and (7), although these two
nodes are not the same because of the weight functions. Thus, these nodes
share some similarity between them, and there is no need to explore both
nodes because of the same behaviour. Exploration of one node is sufficient.
This observation leads to the key novelty in our stochastic model checker:
behaviour similarity relation among states, which always results in a succinct
model and makes the verification possible.
3.2 Behaviour similarity relation
Definition 6 For two state s1 = 〈σ1, pi1〉 and s2 = 〈σ2, pi2〉 such as s1 is
generated earlier than s2 by Algorithm 1 such that s1 is generated at the
t1-th iteration and s2 at the t2-th iteration (t1 ≤ t2), s1 is behaviour similar
to s2 under FP, GFP and AFFFP with best response, denoted as s1  s2,
if the following condition holds:
s1  s2 ≡ (σ1 = σ2) ∧
( ∧
1≤i∈I
ri1,t1 - r
i
2,t2
)
, (15)
where rik,tk (k = 1, 2) is the expected rewards that player i has over its
actions Ai.
Let σik (k = 1, 2) be the strategy of player i in state sk, a
i
tk
∈ Ai the
action chosen to be executed in sk, and atk ∈ A the joint action executed in
sk. Note that at1 = at2, and therefore, a
i
t1 = a
i
t2. Given a path ρ = s
′
0 · · · s′m
such that s′0 is obtained at the t′0-th iteration, let ω(ρ) = at′0 · · · at′0+m−1 be
the sequence of joint actions such that at′0 is executed in s
′
j (0 ≤ j ≤ m−1).
Let sˇk be the predecessor of sk, σˇk the probability distribution in sˇk, and aˇk
the joint action selected in sˇk. We define r
i
1,t1
- ri2,t2 iff all the following
conditions holds.
(6.1)
argmax
ai∈Ai
ri1,t1(a
i)− ri1,t1−1(ai) =
argmax
ai∈Ai
ri2,t2(a
i)− ri2,t2−1(ai) (16)
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(6.2) If σˇ1 = σˇ2 = σ1, then ∀ai ∈ Ai such that σik(ai) = 0, we either have
ri2,t2(a
i)− ri1,t1(ai) ≤ ri2,t2(ait2)− ri1,t1(ait1) (17)
or
ri(ait1 , a
−i
t1
) = max
ai∈Ai
ri(ai, a−i). (18)
(6.3) If there is a path ρ = s′0 · · · s′n such that s′0 = s1 and s′n = s2 and
n ≥ 1, then ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , n},
σ1,j = σ2,j ∧
∧
1≤i≤I
ri2,t2(a
i
t2+j) ≤ ri1,t1(ait1+j), (19)
when FP is used
σ1,j = σ2,j ∧
∧
1≤i≤I
ri2,t2(a
i
t2+j) ≥ ri1,t1(ait1+j), (20)
when GFP and AFFFP is used
where σk,j (k = 1, 2) is the joint strategy obtained by executing a se-
quence of joint actions ω(s′0 · · · s′j) from sk.
(6.4) If n = 1, then ∧
1≤i≤I
ri2,t2(a
i
t2) ≥ ri1,t1(ait1). (21)
(6.5) If there is no path from s1 to s2, then σˇ1 = σˇ2 and∧
1≤i∈I
ri2,t2(a
i
t2) ≥ ri1,t1(ait1), (22)
when FP is used
∧
1≤i∈I
(
ri2,t2(a
i
t2) ≥ ri1,t1(ait1) ∧ (23)∧
ai∈Ai,ai 6=ait1
ri1,t1(a
i) < ri2,t2(a
i)
)
,
when GFP and AFFFP is used.
3.3 Linearity of expected reward in FP type algorithms.
In this subsection, we show the linear relation of the expected rewards of a
player when Fictitious Play based learning algorithms are used. The results
of this section will be used in developing the behaviour similarity relation
for these algorithms.
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Given two states s1 and s2 with σ1 = σ2, where the same action a is
played in both states of s1 and s2. Assume s1 and s2 are generated at the
t1-th and t2-th iteration respectively with t1 ≤ t2. Updates of player i’s
estimations of its opponents’ strategies in FP, GFP, and AFFFP will be the
following, ∀j ∈ I:
• Fictitious play updates:
σi→jt1+1 =
{
(1− 1t1+2)σ
i→j
t1
(aj) + 1t1+2 if a
j ∈ a
(1− 1t1+2)σ
i→j
t1
(aj) if aj 6∈ a ,
σi→jt2+1 =
{
(1− 1t2+2)σ
i→j
t2
(aj) + 1t2+2 if a
j ∈ a
(1− 1t2+2)σ
i→j
t2
(aj) if aj 6∈ a (24)
• Geometric fictitious play updates:
σi→jt1+1 =
{
(1− α)σi→jt1 (aj) + α if aj ∈ a
(1− α)σi→jt1 (aj) if aj 6∈ a
,
σi→jt2+1 =
{
(1− α)σi→jt2 (aj) + α if aj ∈ a
(1− α)σi→jt2 (aj) if aj 6∈ a
(25)
• Adaptive forgetting factor fictitious play updates:
σi→jt1+1 =
{
(1− αt1)σi→jt1 (aj) + αt1 if aj ∈ a
(1− αt1)σi→jt1 (aj) if aj 6∈ a
,
σi→jt2+1 =
{
(1− αt2)σi→jt2 (aj) + αt2 if aj ∈ a
(1− αt2)σi→jt2 (aj) if aj 6∈ a
(26)
The expected reward of each action ai for state si (i = 1, 2) is computed
as follows when joint action a has been played:
riti(a
i, σ−iti (a
−i)) =
∑
aj∈A−i
(
r(ai, aj)×
∏
k:ak∈aj
σi→kti (a
k)
)
. (27)
The elements of
∏
k:ak∈aj σ
i→k
ti (a
k) for FP, GFP and AFFFP are updated
the above stated estimations.
The following Lemmas can be induced:
Lemma 1 Assume state s is generated in the t-th iteration of a learning
process and the joint action a is played in s. Let a−i(j) be the action of player
j (j 6= i) in a−i, and σi→jt (a−i(j)) the element of σi→jt which corresponds to
the action a−i(j). For all actions in Ai \ {a−i(j)}, the rank among them in
σi→jt is maintained in σ
i→j
t+1 , i.e., if σ
i→j
t (a
j
1) > σ
i→j
t (a
j
2), then σ
i→j
t+1 (a
j
1) >
σi→jt+1 (a
j
2), ∀aj1, aj2 ∈ Aj \ {a−i(j)}.
15
Proof 2 Player i updates its estimates about the strategies of its opponents
using a−i. Then σi→jt+1 (a
−i(j)) will be increased by 1t (1−σi→jt (a−i(j))) and for
all aj ∈ Aj \ {a−i(j)}, the estimate σi→jt+1 (aj) will be decreased by 1tσi→jt (aj).
For any two numbers x and y, we have x > y∧ t > 0⇔ (1− 1t )x > (1− 1t )y.
Lemma 2 Assume that the same joint action a is played in any two con-
secutive iterations, i.e., t-th and (t + 1)-th iterations, using FP, GFP or
AFFFP. Given two actions xi ∈ Ai and yi ∈ Ai (yi 6= xi) of player i of
which xi is the best response to a, let
rclw† = rit+1(x
i, σ−it+1(x
−i))− rit(xi, σ−it (x−i)),
w‡ = rit+1(y
i, σ−it+1(y
−i))− rit(yi, σ−it (x−i)),
w¯† = rit+2(x
i, σ−it+2(x
−i))− rit+1(xi, σ−it+1(x−i)),
w¯‡ = rit+2(y
i, σ−it+2(y
−i))− rit+1(yi, σ−it+1(y−i)).
We have w† > w‡ and w¯† > w¯‡.
Proof 3 The fact that xi is the best response to a indicates that if σ−i(a−i) =
1, then player i will choose action xi at the next iteration. If σ−i(a−i) <
1, then there exists a threshold 0 < f < 1 such that player i will con-
tinue to choose action ai when σ−i(a−i) < f ; player i will choose xi when
σ−i(a−i) ≥ f [5]. As the expected rewards are linear functions, we have
w¯† > 0, which means that player i’s confidence on selecting xi is increas-
ing as a is played again. This confidence will keep increasing as σ−i(a−i)
increases, until σ−i(a−i) ≥ f and then xi is played. If there exists another
action yi 6= xi whose expected reward is also increased at the (t + 1)-th it-
eration, then we have w‡ > 0. If its expected reward is increasing faster
than xi, i.e., w† < w‡ and w¯† < w¯‡, then at a later iteration of any of the
game playing process FP, GFP and AFFFP, it is possible to select yi if a is
played sufficient number of times to reach σ−i(a−i) ≥ f . However, this is a
contradiction because the best response to a is xi and not yi. Furthermore,
we cannot have w† < w‡ ∧ w¯† ≥ w¯‡ or w† ≥ w‡ ∧ w¯† < w¯‡ because of the
expected rewards are linear functions with respect to the estimates of other
players’ strategies.
3.4 State space reduction
Now we can explain what similarity means for FP based learning algorithms.
First, we need to define BSCC actions as follows. Let σs denote that the
strategy σ in a state s = 〈σ, pi〉.
Definition 7 Given a BSCC bscc, the corresponding BSCC actions is the
set of actions Abscc ⊆ A such that
Abscc = {a ∈ A | ∃s ∈ bscc such that σs(a) > 0}.
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Theorem 2 Given two states s1 and s2 such that s1  s2 under FP, GFP,
and AFFFP, if a set of BSCC actions Abscc can be reached from s1, then
Abscc will be reached from s2.
Proof 4 In order to complete this proof it is needed to show that when
two states, s1 and s2 are found to be similar then the same actions will be
selected in their successor states and eventually they will converge to the
same BSCC. We should notice here that it is not necessary for both states
to need the same number of successor states in order to reach a BSCC.
Suppose that s1 is generated at iteration t1 and s2 at t2 and we have
t1 ≤ t2. For all the variants of FP, that s1 and s2 are found similar belong
to one of the following four cases:
1. There is no path from s1 to s2 and s1 itself is a BSCC;
2. There is no path from s1 to s2 and s1 alone is not a BSCC;
3. s2 is the direct successor state of s1;
4. There are intermediate states between s1 and s2.
Case 1:
As s1 is a single state BSCC, the joint action a selected in s1 will be played
infinitely from s1 onward, which implies that a Nash equilibrium is reached
by playing a. By definition of behaviour similarity, the same joint action a
will be also played in s2, and therefore, the same Nash equilibrium is reached.
By the definition of Nash equilibrium, we know that from s2, action a will
be played permanently.
Case 2:
Similarly to Case 1 since s1  s2, conditions (6.1), (6.2) and (6.5) should be
satisfied. This case can be divided in two sub-cases. The first one consists
of the instances where σˇ1 = σˇ2 6= σ1, which means that the joint actions
aˇk (k = 1, 2) from the predecessors of s1 and s2 are the same, but they
are different from the action atk selected in s1 and s2. In both s1 and s2,
the selected joint action changes from aˇk to its best response atk , which
denotes that the players in both states reach the necessary confidence level
in order to change actions [2, 5]. Since atk is not a Nash equilibrium, there
exists another joint action a¯tk that is the best response to atk . Furthermore,
we have a¯t1 = a¯t2 due to at1 = at2 and condition (6.5). This condition
is used to guarantee that the selected action is not affected by smooth best
response at the initial iteration. As the best response a¯itk to a
i
tk
for player
i is deterministic, if the joint best response a¯t1 is not equal to a¯t2, then
we know that there exists a player j that excises its best response earlier
than some other players. This asynchronous change is caused by the smooth
best response at the initial iteration: players chooses a non-best response to
their initial estimation. Condition (6.5) is designed to prevent two states
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from being classified similar when asynchronous changes can occur in their
successor states. Note here that in the case of GFP and AFFFP, the learning
rate will be the same in both s1 ans s2, as it does not depend on the number of
iterations. For that reason, the extra constraint in Equation (24) is needed.
When the joint action a¯tk is selected, the estimates of opponents strategies
will be increased for the elements that participate in the joint action a¯tk .
Players will learn that a¯tk is selected and eventually they will select the best
response to a¯tk , say a¯tk , simultaneously. This process will continue until a
Nash equilibrium or a BSCC is reached.
In the second case, the same action has been played in s1, s2 and their
predecessors. Similarly to the first case because of condition (6.1), there is
another action a¯itk that is best response to a
i
tk
. Nonetheless, it not necessary
that the players will simultaneously change their action and result to the
same joint action from both states. Assume that exists another action bi
in state s2 such as r
i
2,t2
(aitk) − ri2,t2(bi) < rit2(aitk) − ri2,t2(a¯itk). This implies
that it is possible for ri2,t2(b
i) to exceed ri2,t2(a
i
tk
) in fewer iterations than
ri2,t2(a¯
i
tk
) will do. Condition (6.2) is designed to overcome this problem.
This condition ensures that the difference in expected reward between the
selected and the non-selected actions in s2, which has the slowest learning
rate due to t2 ≥ t1, is smaller than the one in s1. Condition (6.2) implies
that ri1,t1(a
i
tk
) − ri1,t1(bi) < ri2,t2(aitk) − ri2,t2(bi). Therefore, if bi was to be
selected from a successor of s2, then the expected reward of b
i should be
increased more from s2 than from s1. Therefore, because of Lemma 1 and
the Condition (6.5), it is not possible for bi to be selected from a successor
of s2 given that it was not selected from a successor of s1.
Now we assume that a¯tk has been played in a successor state of s1 and
s2 at the (t1 + n1)-th and (t2 + n2)-th iterations respectively. We have the
following inequalities:
ri1,t1+n1(a¯
i
tk
) > ri1,t1+n1(a
i
tk
) ri2,t2+n2(a¯
i
tk
) > ri2,t2+n2(a
i
tk
).
If a¯tk is not a Nash equilibrium, we assume that a¨
i ∈ Ai is the action of
robot i that has the highest increment in the expected rewards such that
ri1,t1+n1(a¨
i) < ri1,t1+n1(a¯
i
tk
) ri2,t2+n2(a¨
i) < ri2,t2+n2(a¯
i
tk
).
If the expected reward of action ci ∈ Ai is also increasing, then we have:
ri1,t1+n1(c
i) < ri1,t1+n1(a¯
i
tk
) ri2,t2+n2(c
i) < ri2,t2+n2(a¯
i
tk
).
Assume that a¨i will be selected at a successor state of s1. Therefore the
expected reward of action a¨i will exceed the expected reward of a¯itk either in
fewer iterations than that of ci does, or if they need the same number of
iterations, then its expected reward will be greater than that of ci. Based
on the linearity of the expected reward with respect to the expected strategy,
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Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and the above inequalities, the same will also happen
in the successor states of s2 with a¨
i being eventually selected. If a¨i is not a
Nash equilibrium, then the next action will be selected from both states for
the same reason until a Nash equilibrium or a BSCC is reached.
Case 3:
In this case s2 is the immediate successor of si, i.e. t2 = t1 + 1. Similarly
to the previous cases since s1  s2 conditions (6.1), (6.2) and (6.4) will
be satisfied. If s1 is a BSCC then the selected action in all its successor
states will be the same, e.g., a. Equation (16) and (21) show that a will
be played also in the successor state of s2, since players use best response
to select actions. Although BR does not guarantee that there will not exist
another action a¯ that will be selected in a later state. However, if Equation
(18) is met, then player i will not like to change its action, as this will be
the one which will maximise its reward. If Equation (17) is satisfied, then
the difference between the expected reward of selected action and the actions
ai : ai ∈ Ai ∧ ai 6∈ a is increasing in s2, as Equation (17) can be written as
∀ai ∈ Ai such that σik(ai) = 0:
ri1,t1(a
i
t1)− ri1,t1(ai) ≤ ri2,t2(ait2)− ri2,t2(ai).
Therefore, the expected reward of joint action a will be increased more than
all the other joint actions, and thus, it will be selected in all the successor
states of s1 and s2. Thus a is a Nash equilibrium and s1 and s2 can be
characterised as similar states.
Case 4:
In this case, conditions (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) hold, but FP, GFP, and
AFFFP are treated differently in condition (6.3). In this loop s′0 · · · s′ns′0,
the estimations of a player’s opponents strategies, i.e., Equation (24), of FP
would converge to the number of occurrences each joint action appears in
the loop. That is, if a joint action a appears in the loop m times over the
N = n+ 1 actions of the loop, then for each player i ∈ {1, · · · , I}, its esti-
mates of the opponents strategies σi→j(aj) is mN for all j ∈ {1, · · · , I} \ {i}
and aj ∈ a [5]. Thus, the fluctuations of the expected reward will vanish
through time. Hence if the expected reward for a specific joint action of
the loop increases, this denotes that s1 is not a BSCC. On the other hand,
GFP and AFFFP do not converge to the mixed Nash equilibrium of a game.
Instead, they will converge to a mixed strategy, which depends on α and
λ respectively. The expected reward for the joint action a will be greater
than mN [5, 19]. Therefore, it is expected that the estimates of the opponents
playing the observed actions will increase, as well as the specific expected
rewards, although the increment will get smaller in every iteration of the
loop. Thus, when Equation (20) is satisfied, the the same loop is generated
from s1 and s2 and their successors.
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(b) GFP with α = 0.2 and
AFFFP with λ0 = 0.8
Figure 3: The DTMCs for FP, GFP and AFFFP on the simple coordination
example
4 Case studies
We have implemented our method in a prototype tool. In this section we
present case studies to demonstrate our performance evaluation method on
several case studies.
4.1 Simple coordination game
The game described by Equation (4) is a symmetric game. In this game,
players can easily be trapped in cycles composed of joint actions (b1, a2)
and (b2, a1). This cycle does not have any reward. Figures 3 illustrates the
DTMCs (with weights omitted) for the FP, GFP and AFFFP,algorithms for
the example in Equation (4) under the initial estimation in Equation (9).
In each DTMC, the ellipse nodes represent the initial states. The BSCCs
are shown in nodes with rounded corners.
These figures clearly illustrate that FP, GFP and AFFFP cannot avoid
this cycle.
Three measures were used to compare the performance of the algorithms:
the number of states, the depth needed to reach these states, and the prob-
ability each algorithm has to converge into Pareto efficient Nash equilibria.
These are three general measures that can be used in order to compare the
above mentioned algorithms. Depending on the problem, more measures
can be defined in our tool, such as the probability of a state of interest be-
ing reached even if it is not a Nash equilibrium, or the probability of not
reaching a specific state. However, the exploration of all possible perfor-
mance measures is not the focus of this work. The computational time is
not reported because in the most of the cases were just a fraction of one
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Table 1: Experimental results for the simple coordination game with τ = 1.
Performance FP GFP AFFFP
Number of states 9 64 31
Number of iterations 2 57 24
Convergence probability 0.7204 0.8313 0.6666
Table 2: Process to create the reward matrix of the complex coordination
game where each player has 20 available actions to choose with δ = 0.001.
· set n = 5, ζ = 1 + 1
n1−δ , β = 1− 1n2∗(1−δ)
· u(i, j) = 1, ∀i ∈ [n+ 1, 4n], j = i
· u(i, j) = 1, ∀i ∈ [2, n], j = i− 1
· u(i, j) = ζ, ∀i ∈ [n+ 1, 4n], j = i− 1
· u(i, j) = ζ, i = 2n+ 1, j = 4n
· u(i, j) = β, ∀j ≤ 2n, i > j
· u(i, j) = β, ∀i− j ≤ n, i > j
· u(i, j) = β, ∀i ∈ [2n+ 1, j − n], j ∈ [3n+ 1, 4n]
· u(i, j) = 0, Otherwise
second.
In the experiments, we set τ = 1 for smooth best response used in the first
iteration. We generate 100 random initial estimates and run each algorithm
over them to test their average performance, as the initial estimate can have
strong impact on the performance. The results we obtained for these games
are reported in Table 1. GFP has the highest probability to reach the pure
Nash equilibria among all FP-based algorithms.
4.2 Complex coordination game
This game was introduced in [8] in order to show the asymptotic properties
of FP. It is also a symmetric game where the rewards for each player is the
same. The rewards are generated according to Table 2. Each player has
20 actions in this example, but it can be extended to a larger number of
actions. The full reward matrix can be found in Appendix.
It was shown in [8] that for any δ > 0, FP will always converge to a
solution with a reward no less than ξ, where ξ is defined as the utility of
the Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium subtracting a constant  = 12 . Further-
more, this result was obtained for a single initial joint action (a1, b1).
In this work, we study the performance of FP under random initial con-
ditions with 0 < κi←jt (aj) ≤ 1,∀aj ∈ Aj ,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , I} and δ = 0.001.
We found that for this particular δ and initial conditions, FP almost surely
converges to the Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium. This supports the impor-
tance of the proposed methodology, since even in cases where the theoretical
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Table 3: Experimental results for the complex coordination game with
τ = 1.
Performance FP GFP AFFFP
Number of states 2373 2678 2271
Number of iterations 90 7 32
Convergence probability 0.9969 0.999 0.9115
properties of a game are well known, there are specific conditions which can
be of interest in practical applications where the outcome of FP will defer.
Additionally, under specific initial conditions there is a temporary cycle
between two joint actions, e.g., ac1 = (b20, a6) and a
c2 = (b6, a19), which
disappears after the tth iteration. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) depict the expected
reward of each action of player 1 and 2 respectively. In both figures the
expected rewards of the actions in support of ac1 and ac2 are similar in the
initial iterations. However, after t > 500 iterations, FP converge to a Pareto
efficient Nash equilibrium, which is a single action whose expected reward is
maximised. The reason for this behaviour is illustrated in Figures 5(a) and
5(b), where Players estimates of their opponent’s strategy are depicted after
100 and 2000 iterations respectively. In Figure 5(a), there are fluctuations
in Player 1’s estimates that leads to the cycles between the joint actions.
These fluctuations disappear in Figure 5(b) when FP converged to the Nash
equilibrium.
This behaviour was captured by the stopping criterion we used for FP.
When 100 iterations were used the proposed methodology does not produce a
terminal state. Thus, based on the fluctuations of the estimates about play-
ers’ opponents’ strategies, and consecutively their expected rewards, there
were no evidence of a persistent cycle or a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium.
When we increase the number of iterations to 3000, the Pareto efficient Nash
equilibrium was identified as a terminal state.
In this example, FP, GFP and AFFFP have good performance. Their
convergence probability is very close to 1. From Tables 1 and 3, we con-
jure that GFP has great potential to be applied in practice for its high
convergence probability and fast convergence.
4.3 Shapley’s game
Games can often be classified in two categories based on the structure of
their reward function: cooperative and non-cooperative games. The main
difference between these two categories is that in cooperative games, there
is a joint action that maximises all players’ reward, while in non-cooperative
games, no joint actions can maximise all players’ reward. In the latter case,
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(a) Player 1
(b) Player 2
Figure 4: Expected rewards in the complex coordination game
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(a) 80 iterations
(b) 400 iterations
Figure 5: Estimates of the opponent’ strategy in the complex coordination
game
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Figure 6: Simulation for Shappley’s game
we selected a joint action that is “fair” for both players.
r =

a1 a2 a3
b1 0, 0 1, 0 0, 1
b2 0, 1 0, 0 1, 0
b3 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
 (28)
Equation (28) shows the Shapley’s game [17], which does not have any
pure Nash equilibria. However, there are two mixed strategy equlibria. In
the first mixed strategy equilibrium, the players choose with the same prob-
ability the joint actions (b1, a1), (b2, a2) and (b3, a3). In the second one, the
players choose actions based on the following cycle:
(b1, a2)→ (b1, a3)→ (b2, a3)→ (b2, a1) (29)
→ (b3, a1)→ (b3, a2)→ (b1, a2).
Figure 6 depicts the probability of players to reach a decision in Shapley’s
game in Equation (28) when FP is used. In particular, each colour represent
one of the joint actions that comprises the cycle in Equation (30). From
Figure 6, it is reasonable to assume that FP converges to a single action
because this joint action is played for more than a thousand iterations of
the game. However, it is well known [17] that FP is trapped in this cycle,
where each of the six joint actions in this cycle is repeated for a large, but
still finite, number of iterations as t → ∞. In particular, the number of
repetitions for each joint action in a loop is increased as t → ∞. Our tool
does not terminate on this cycle because of its irregular shape.
However, our tool successfully captures the cycle in the first mixed strat-
egy equilibrium. This cycle can only be generated when both players use
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equal weights as the initial estimates, which is shown in Equation (30).
κ1→20 = [
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
]T and κ2→10 = [
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
], (30)
It is also worth noting that if two or more actions have the same expected
rewards when computing Equation (1) in best response, which is the case
in this mixed strategy equilibrium, then the first action will be chosen to
execute. The DTMC showing the cycle is presented in Figure 7, where the
states and transitions for the second equilibium is omitted. Note that the
prefix before the cycle in the middle and right branches in this figure is
generated due to the smooth best response rule in the first iteration. Under
best response and equal initial weights in Equation (30), the players would
definitely choose (b1, a1), i.e., the left branch in the figure, while smooth best
response can force them to play (b2, a2) (the middle branch) and (b3, a3) (the
right branch) with non-zero probability. These two branches enter the cycle
after the weights of all actions become equal again and this time they use
best response.
4.4 Discussion
The 20 × 20 symmetric game a game, which was introduced in [8] in order
to show the poor performance of FP . Nonetheless their reported results are
not always correct since for the specific parameters FP converged almost
always in the NE of the game.
The experimental results are indicative of that no algorithm performed
perfectly in all games initialised. The two variants of Regret Matching have
better performance than the other algorithms on the simple coordination
game, but much worse performance on the complex coordination game than
the FP based algorithms. Although GFP has the best average performance
in the two coordination games, there exist initial conditions in the complex
coordination game where GFP fails to converge to Nash equilibrium. This
suggests that there could be no single learning algorithm that is optimal for
every competitive game or cooperative-game-based distributed optimisation.
Therefore, a selection method for learning algorithms, such as our tool, is
useful to have in practice.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a novel approach that can evaluate the performance
of game-theoretic learning algorithms over finite time. The key complexity
reduction technique is is the use of a behaviour similarity relation, which
makes verification feasible by reducing the number of states. The effective-
ness has been tested on a set of learning algorithms using various examples.
These examples illustrated the principles of our new method as they have
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Figure 7: DTMC for the mixed strategy equilibium in Shappley’s game
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relatively well-known dynamics and equilibra, which allowed us to carefully
examine the experimental results and confirm their correctness. The cumu-
lative performance result clearly demonstrated the importance of using our
approach in this domain.
Future work will include investigating the application of the techniques
to multi-player games and cooperative games in robotics and other real-
world scenarios for distributed optimisation. Extending our approach to
more learning algorithms is another direction we want to pursue. The pro-
posed behaviour similarity relation can be used for any myopic algorithms
and FP based algorithms which do not use randomisation for computing
σ−i. However, some FP based algorithms adopt randomisation to predict
other players’ strategies, such as Extended Kalman Filter Fictitious Play
(EKFFP) [18] and Particle Filter Fictitious Play (PFFP) [20]. It is a chal-
lenge to define behaviour similarity relation and calculate the upper bound
of maximum error for these algorithms. Another direction is to evaluate the
impact of initial strategies.
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Appendix: Reward matrix for the complex coordi-
nation game
r =

a1 a2 a3a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a8 a9 a10
b1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b3 0.95594 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b4 0.95594 0.95594 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b5 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
b6 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0 0 0
b7 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0 0
b8 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0
b9 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0
b10 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1
b11 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099
b12 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b13 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b14 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b15 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b16 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b17 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b18 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b19 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b20 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16 a17 a18 a19 a20
b1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b11 1 0 0 0 0 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099
b12 1.2099 1 0 0 0 0 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b13 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0 0 0 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594
b14 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0 0 0 0.95594 0.95594
b15 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0 0 0 0.95594
b16 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0 0 0
b17 0 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0 0
b18 0 0 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0 0
b19 0 0 0 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1 0
b20 0 0 0 0 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 0.95594 1.2099 1

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